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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, 
(hereinafter "Petitioner" or "UAMPS"), respectfully replies to 
the Brief of Respondents, Public Service Commission of Utah 
("PSC"), Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"), and the Utility 
Shareholders of Utah (the "Shareholders"). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Petitioner and Respondents agree that the "correction-
of-error" standard should govern this Court's review of the 
facial constitutionality of Section 11-13-27 of the Utah 
Interlocal Co-operation Act ("Interlocal Act"). Petitioner and 
Respondents disagree, however, on the standard to be applied in 
reviewing whether Section 11-13-27 was unconstitutionally 
applied by the PSC. 
Respondents argue that the issue combines both 
questions of law and fact. Therefore, Respondents suggest that 
the PSC's application of the statute should be upheld if it is 
"reasonable." Petitioner disagrees. The question of whether 
Section 11-13-27 was unconstitutionally applied is purely a 
legal issue. The issue is not, as suggested by Respondents, 
whether the PSC correctly interpreted the facts surrounding the 
construction and operation of the transmission line, the effect 
of the project on the overall public interest, and the adverse 
effect on the customers of UAMPSf member municipalities. 
Rather, the question is whether the PSC is constitutionally 
empowered to consider those factors at all. Determination of 
the issue is dependent solely on the parameters of Article VI, 
§ 28 of the Utah Constitution. There is simply no factual 
component involved. 
This Court has consistently held that constitutional 
interpretation is a question of general law: 
[gjeneral questions of law include the 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution and 
covers questions regarding whether the PSC has 
regularly pursued its authority and whether it 
has violated any constitutional . . . rights of 
the petitioner. 
Utah Dep't of Admin. Services v. Public Service Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). Therefore, this Court should apply 
the ,?correction-of-error" standard when determining whether the 
PSC violated UAMPS1 constitutional rights by considering 
factors which are within the sole discretion of UAMPSf 
municipal members. As such, the PSCfs decision should be 
accorded no deference. See St. Francis Hospital Center v. 
Heckler, 714 F.2d 872, 873 (7th Cir. 1983) (judicial deference 
to administrative expertise does not extend to judging the 
constitutionality of a statute or regulatory scheme). 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE FILING OF A JOINT BRIEF BY RESPONDENTS 
UP&L, THE SHAREHOLDERS, AND THE PSC IS AN 
IMPERMISSIBLE EX PARTE CONTACT 
Petitioner objects to the filing of a joint brief by 
the PSC, UP&L and the Shareholders. Such joint action would 
appear to violate the Utah Code's prohibition against ex parte 
contacts between PSC employees and parties in interest. 
Section 54-7-1.5 of the Utah Code specifically states: 
No member of the Public Service Commission. 
. . or commission employee who is or may 
reasonably be expected to be involved in the 
decision making process, shall make or knowingly 
cause to be made to any party any communication 
relevant to the merits of any matter under 
adjudication unless notice and an opportunity to 
be heard are afforded to all parties. No party 
shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any 
member of the commission . . . or commission 
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to 
be involved in the decision making process, an ex 
parte communication relevant to the merits of any 
matter under adjudication. Any member of the 
commission . . . or commission employee who 
receives an ex parte communication shall place 
the communication into the public record of the 
proceedings and afford all parties an opportunity 
to comment on the information. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1.5. 
Petitioner does not allege the existence of ex parte 
contacts during the actual hearing before the PSC. Petitioner 
notes, however, that issues related to this appeal are still 
pending before the PSC, including the question of whether UAMPS 
will be afforded joint participation in the UP&L transmission 
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line. Therefore, this matter is still under ffadjudication" for 
purposes of the above-quoted section. 
The Court need only read the Respondents' brief to 
become aware of the intricate legal and factual discussions 
that must have occurred between attorneys for the PSC and 
UP&L. Such communications give the appearance of an improper 
ex parte relationship between the PSC and UP&L. 
B. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN THIS APPEAL. 
Respondents allege that this Court lacks jurisdiction 
over Petitioner's appeal on the grounds that UAMPS failed to 
challenge the constitutionality of Section 11-13-27 in its 
Rehearing Petition. Brief of Respondents at p. 17. 
Respondents' assertion is unfounded. Contrary to Respondents' 
assertion, UAMPS' Petition specifically alleged that the PSC 
was constitutionally prohibited from interfering with the 
municipal functions of UAMPS and its member cities. An entire 
section of UAMPS' Petition focused on the argument that "[t]he 
Commission Has no Authority to Make a Finding Based on the 
Rates Paid by Ratepayers of Municipal Utilities." Brief of 
Petitioners, Addendum "G" at 8. UAMPS specifically contended 
that: 
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[t]he determination of what is or is not an 
appropriate rate, including what should or should 
not go into rates, is reserved to the 
municipality itself. Under the Constitution, the 
Commission cannot interfere with that 
determination. Logan City v. Public Utilities 
Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961 (1928). For 
a detailed analysis, see pages 66-70 of the 
Post-Hearing Brief of UAMPS filed with the 
Commission on August 4, 1986 in the captioned 
matter. 
Id. at 8-9 (Emphasis added). 
It is important to note that UAMPS was not attempting 
to raise the constitutional challenge to PSC jurisdiction for 
the first time in its Rehearing Petition. To the contrary, the 
PSCTs constitutional authority over UAMPS was a central issue 
throughout the proceeding. UAMPS first raised its 
constitutional challenge in its Original Application. In its 
Amended Verified Application, UAMPS stated: 
UAMP is submitting this application under the 
authority of Utah Code Ann. §11-13-27. 
However, UAMPS does not, by this application, 
concede the constitutionality of or otherwise 
waive its right to object to the foregoing 
statute. 
Brief of Petitioner, Addendum "DfT at paragraph 6 (Emphasis 
added). The issue was also fully briefed and presented to the 
PSC. See Brief of Petitioner, Addendum "E" at pp. 10-15. In 
its Brief, UAMPS specifically contended that the "Commission 
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should rule that the statute is unconstitutional/' lEd. at 
10. UP&L and the Shareholders themselves requested the PSC to 
rule on UAMPST constitutional challenge. See Shareholders1 
Proposal for Scheduling or Alternatively, Petition for 
Rehearing dated August 30, 1985, Record at 008883; UP&Lfs 
Motion for Summary Procedures and Stay of Proceedings, dated 
July 17, 1985, Record at 008810. 
Additionally, the PSC fully considered the issue, and 
on October 24, 1985, ruled that Section 11-13-27 was 
constitutional: 
We were also asked to consider the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 11-13-1, et 
seq. as it concerns the creation and functioning 
of UAMPS. A number of the parties have taken 
the position that the Commission may not decide 
the constitutionality of a regulatory statute 
but, rather, must give it an irrebuttable 
presumption of constitutionality. . . . 
Certainly we presume in every case before us that 
the statutory enactments of the Legislature are 
constitutional but such a presumption is not 
irrebuttable. (Citations omitted.) 
Although we conclude that we can, where 
necessary, consider constitutional issues, we 
decline to set aside the presumption of 
constitutionality in this case because we are not 
persuaded by the parties that it is warranted. 
Brief of Respondents, Exhibit "Hf? at pp. 4-5 (Emphasis added). 
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When placed in context, there can be little doubt that 
UAMPS' Rehearing Petition was sufficient to meet the 
jurisdictional prerequisites of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15. 
C. SECTION 11-13-27 OF THE INTERLOCAL ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. 
Respondents suggest that although UAMPS is an 
organization of municipalities, it nevertheless participates 
"in activities of statewide concern." Inherent in Respondents' 
assertion is the suggestion that UAMPS intends to provide 
Even assuming Petitioner's Rehearing Petition was 
insufficiently complete to confer jurisdiction upon this Court, 
the Court may nonetheless address the merits of the action. In 
Williams v. Public Service Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988), 
this Court stated: 
Although we have not subject matter jurisdiction 
over the administrative actions, we deal with the 
contentions raised therein for several reasons. 
First, this approach allows for the most 
expeditious solution to the dispute between the 
parties. All questions were thoroughly briefed 
and fully presented to the Court. . . . Finally, 
this approach is not without precedent. 
Williams, 754 P.2d at 49 n.9 (citations omitted). 
Williams is applicable here. The constitutional issues 
were fully briefed and presented to the Court. Moreover, 
if the Court rules on UAMPS claim, it will dispose of 
issues which will certainly reoccur between UAMPS, UP&L 
and the PSC in the future. 
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utility services to consumers outside the municipal boundaries 
of its member cities. Respondents are wrong in that assessment 
for a number of reasons. 
First, UAMPS was created to allow municipalities to 
supply more cost efficient electric power to their citizens. 
Indeed, the specific purpose underlying the creation of UAMPS, 
as expressed in the Interlocal Act, was to: 
permit local governments to make the most 
efficient use of their powers by enabling them to 
cooperate with other localities on a basis of 
mutual advantage and thereby to provide services 
and facilities in a manner . . . that will accord 
best with geographic, economic, population and 
other factors influencing the needs and 
development of local communities. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-2 (emphasis added). The fact that 
UAMPS1 proposed transmission line would be owned and operated 
by a group of cities rather than individual cities in no way 
diminishes UAMPST central purpose of supplying electric power 
to its member municipalities. The primary purpose of UAMP?S 
proposed transmission line was to meet the needs of municipal 
electric consumers of southwestern Utah. Municipal or 
cooperative loads comprise in excess of 81 percent of the total 
electric loads in Washington County. Brief of Petitioners, 
Addendum MFff at p. 18. 
Second, although UAMPS purchases and sells power on 
the wholesale market, it does so to benefit its member 
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municipalities. It should be noted that such sales by UP&L are 
not subject to PSC jurisdiction, either. 16 U.S.C § 2612 
(1985). 
Respondents also suggest that even though UAMPS ? only 
members are municipalities, UAMPS is nonetheless a nseparate 
body politic.f? As such, Respondents contend that UAMPS 
possesses no inherent municipal powers which would prevent its 
regulation by the PSC. Contrary to the suggestion of 
Respondents, quasi-municipal corporations, including those 
organized under the Interlocal Act, are embodied with municipal 
powers and functions. As this Court has stated, a 
quasi-municipal corporation "is an agency of the state vested 
with some of the powers and attributes of a municipality.ff 
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530, 541 (1935) 
(Emphasis added). In this regard, UAMPS is embodied with those 
collective municipal powers necessary to provide utility 
services to its member cities. 
Respondents rely on the case of Lehi City v. Meiling, 
48 P.2d at 530, for the proposition that Article VI, Section 28 
of the Utah Constitution does not prevent PSC regulation of 
quasi-municipal corporations similar to UAMPS. Respondents' 
reliance on Lehi City is unfounded. In Lehi City, the issue 
presented to the Court was not whether a state agency was 
constitutionally prohibited from regulating a quasi-municipal 
corporation. Rather, the question was whether cities were 
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constitutionally prevented from becoming members of 
quasi-municipal corporations. Therefore, the question of 
whether a state agency could regulate the municipal functions 
of a quasi-municipal corporation was never presented to the 
Court. 
In upholding the authority of cities to join with 
quasi-municipal corporations, the Lehi City Court expressly 
recognized the practical necessity of cities banding together 
in order to provide utility services to their citizens. 
Referring to the supply of water, the Lehi City Court stated: 
The [Colorado River Water Project] is of such 
magnitude and the need for water by many cities 
so great that it was impracticable, if not 
impossible, for any one of the cities to 
undertake the project alone. Provision therefore 
was made for concerted action on the part of the 
municipalities through a new and different 
corporation by means of which many cities and 
towns would cooperate in obtaining an increased 
water supply . . . . Because of the magnitude of 
the project, its success depends on the united 
resources and efforts of the cities, towns, and 
other water users within the area which can be 
served. 
Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 534. 
D. SECTION 11-13-27 WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED BY THE PSC. 
Many of the factors identified by the PSC in its March 
Order involve policy considerations which have been 
constitutionally assigned to the exclusive discretion of the 
-10-
municipalities themselves. If the PSC is allowed to exercise 
jurisdiction over UAMPS in such a manner, UAMPSf members would 
be stripped of their constitutional right to conduct their own 
2 
affairs. Respondents counter with two basic points. First, 
Respondents allege that the PSC has a general statutory mandate 
to consider the interests of all Utah citizens. Petitioner 
does not dispute this statutory directive. However, the issue 
is not whether Section 11-13-27 commands the PSC to consider 
the interests of all statewide electric consumers. Rather, the 
issue is whether the PSC may consider factors which 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in the Logan City case: 
To say a municipality, its taxpayers and 
citizens, have the right to own and operate a 
utility, but may not be permitted to operate it 
at a rate less than a privately owned utility 
. . . is, in effect, to deny to a municipality 
whatever advantage or ability it may have, if 
any, to furnish and supply the product at a rate 
or charge lower than that of a privately owned 
utility for gain and profit. 
Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 72 Utah 536, 271 P. at 
969 (1928). It follows that the PSC may not interfere with a 
municipality's right to charge those utility rates which are 
high enough to allow the city to recover its investment in the 
necessary transmission facilities, and which allow the city to 
use the most economic resources available. 
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have been constitutionally determined to be within the 
exclusive discretion of municipal sovereigns. Respondents' 
point simply begs the question. 
Second, Respondents allege that the PSC?s factual 
findings, unrelated to UAMPS, are sufficient to support the 
PSCfs Order. Again, this point begs the question. The issue 
is not whether the PSCfs factual determination is supported by 
the Record. UAMPS has not appealed the PSC?s findings. The 
key point is whether the PSC considered factors outside its 
jurisdictional authority and violated the constitutional rights 
of UAMPS and its member cities. 
Respondents cite no case which contradicts the 
authority of Logan City v. Public Utilities CommTn., 72 Utah 
536, 271 P. 961 (1928) and Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 
279 P. 878 (1928). These cases are controlling authority for 
the proposition that the PSC exceeded its jurisdiction when it 
considered policy considerations assigned solely to the 
discretion of municipal government. 
E. THE ISSUES RAISED BY THIS APPEAL ARE NOT 
MOOT . 
Respondents allege that Petitioner's claim is moot. 
The basis for Respondents' claim is that the 20 mile 
transmission line has been built and that UP&L is presently in 
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the process of constructing the larger 345 kV transmission line 
authorized by the December Order. Respondents' claim is 
factually incorrect and disengenous at best. 
The rights of UAMPS in and to the new larger line are 
still pending before the PSC and will be profoundly effected by 
the outcome of this appeal. Although UP&L has commenced 
construction of the larger 345 kV transmission line, the PSCTs 
December Order allowing UP&L to begin construction was 
specifically conditioned upon Petitioner being granted an 
3 
ownership interest in the new larger line. The December 
Order states: 
The Commission recognizes that UAMPS and DG&T seek an 
ownership interest in the line and further maintain 
that this certificate should be conditioned on their 
being granted such an ownership interest. 
Brief of Respondents, Exhibit ffEff at p. 5. The PSC has 
maintained jurisdiction over this issue and it will be resolved 
in a separate docket as established by the December Order: 
Accordingly, this order authorizing such 
construction, expressly does not alter the status 
quo with respect to the joint use and ownership 
3 
Petitioner is particularly concerned by the allegations 
of Respondents. Petitioner did not object to UP&Lfs 
Application because UAMPS and UP&L were negotiating joint 
ownership in the new line. Petitioner successfully urged the 
PSC to maintain jurisdiction over the joint ownership issue. 
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issues as established in the Order dated March 3, 
1987, in Case Nos. 85-2011-01 and 87-999-08. 
All issues regarding potential joint use or 
ownership in the subject 345 kV transmission 
facilities and associated 138 kV system will be 
considered in a separate part (Phase II) of this 
proceeding in the event the parties are unable to 
reach an agreement. All issues respecting the 
Commission's jurisdiction to order such use or 
ownership are reserved for consideration in such 
proceeding. The parties should continue 
negotiations and report the status of the same. 
Brief of Respondents, Exhibit "E" at pp. 5-6 (Emphasis added). 
A case is moot only "if the requested judicial relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants." Black v. Alpha 
Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1982) (citing Puran 
v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981)). Here, however, the 
Court's decision will profoundly effect the rights of 
Petitioner in and to the transmission lines which were at issue 
before the PSC. As such, Petitioner's case is clearly not 
moot. See Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) (holding that case was not moot in light 
of the fact that lienholders were not seeking to prevent a 
foreclosure sale, which in fact had already occurred, but, were 
seeking to establish their right to a share of sale proceeds, 
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which relief could be granted even though sale was already 
completed). 
F. SECTION 11-13-27 MAY BE SEVERED FROM THE 
INTERLOCAL ACT. 
Respondents raise the issue of whether Section 
11-13-27 may be severed from the Interlocal Act. Respondents 
do not, however, "encourage the far-reaching consequences" of 
holding the Interlocal Act unconstitutional in its entirety. 
Presumably, therefore, the issue is not on appeal. 
Even if Petitioner's case were moot, two exceptions to 
the mootness doctrine would support this Court's decision to 
entertain the issues raised by Petitioner's appeal. First, a 
court may maintain jurisdiction over a moot appeal if the 
matter involved is one of public interest. McRae 
v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1974). Here, the 
constitutional issue of the PSC's authority to regulate 
municipal utility services is of the utmost public importance. 
Second, an appeal should not be dismissed as moot if the 
issues are likely to recur in the future. Orwick v. City of 
Seattle, 103 Wash. 2d 249, 692 P.2d 793 (1984); Marquette v. 
Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. App. 1984); John A. v. San 
Bernadino City Unified School Dist., 33 Cal. 3d. 301, 187 Cal. 
Rptr. 472, 654 P.2d 242 (1982); New Mexico Press Ass'n v. 
Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261, 648 P.2d 300 (1982). Without a ruling 
on the constitutionality of Section 11-13-27, the probability 
of UAMPS appearing again before the PSC is virtually guaranteed 
if UAMPS desires to construct another transmission line. 
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Nonetheless, it is clear that Section 11-13-27 may be severed 
without invalidating the entire act. 
A constitutionally invalid statutory provision may be 
severed if the remaining statutory provisions are 'capable of 
fulfilling legislative intent. Matheson v. Ferry, 657 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1982); Utah v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66, 426 P.2d 13, 
14 (1967); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of 
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977). As manifest in 
Section 11-13-2, the essential purpose of the Interlocal Act is 
to provide a means by which municipalities may provide better 
utility services to their residents. PSC review of UAMPS? 
The purpose of the Interlocal Act as expressed in 
Section 11-13-2 is: 
to permit local governmental units to make the 
most efficient use of their powers by enabling 
them to co-operate with other localities on a 
basis of mutual advantage and thereby to provide 
services and facilities in a manner and pursuant 
to forms of governmental organization that will 
accord best with geographic, economic, population 
and other factors influencing the needs and 
developments of local communities and to provide 
the benefit of economy of scale, economic 
development and utilization of natural resources 
for the overall promotion of the general welfare 
of the State. 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-2. 
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decisions is clearly a secondary and severable purpose. For 
instance, Section 11-13-27 authorizes the PSC to review only 
Mthe construction of any electrical generating plant or 
transmission line." Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-27. The Section 
does not grant the PSC jurisdiction over UAMPS* other 
activities such as their contracts and power pooling 
arrangements with their members. Additionally, Section 
11-13-27 exempts from PSC regulation power projects commenced 
prior to the effective date of the act. Therefore, the 
legislature specifically exempted from regulation the massive 
generating facility being constructed by Intermountain Power 
Agency (IPA). If the Legislature intended to establish PSC 
oversight as a necessary "condition precedent" to the formation 
of quasi-municipal corporations formed to supply electric 
power, the legislature surely would have extended PSC 
jurisdiction to all facets of a quasi-municipal corporation's 
activities, as well as the IPA generating facility. 
Respondent's argument concerning severability is even 
less persuasive when applied to Petitioner's argument that 
Section 11-13-27 was unconstitutionally applied by the PSC. If 
this Court were to hold that the PSC unconstitutionally applied 
Section 11-13-27, the PSC would still maintain jurisdiction 
over UAMPS for purposes of approving certificates of 
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convenience. In determining whether to grant the certificate, 
the PSC would only be constrained from considering factors 
within the exclusive discretion of municipal government. 
Therefore, even assuming that PSC review of the statewide 
impact of UAMPS? utility decisions was an integral legislative 
purpose of the Interlocal Act, that purpose would not be 
undermined by preventing the PSC from evaluating the decisions 
of UAMPS which have a local effect on individual municipalities. 
G. RESPONDENTS MAY NOT REACH BEHIND THE PSCTs 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Throughout their brief, Respondents reach behind the 
PSC's findings of fact and attempt to bolster their legal 
arguments with factual testimony. The Court should disallow 
these assertions since UAMPS has not appealed the PSC's factual 
findings. Respondents should not be allowed to go behind the 
PSC's findings and present portions of the record which present 
their case in the most positive light. Additionally, 
Respondent's factual assertions should be ignored because they 
are irrelevant to the legal issues presented the Court. As 
mentioned previously, the question of the constitutionality of 
Section 11-13-27, both facially and in its ar. lication, is a 
purely legal question. Therefore, the factual assertions of 
Respondents simply cannot aid this Court in deciding the issues 
raised by this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, UAMPS respectfully requests 
this Court to hold that Section 11-13-27 is unconstitutional, 
both facially and as applied by the PSC. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 9^ day of November, 
1988. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By LUl/UiA ^ 2cdL^ 
James A. Holtkamp 
William R. Richards 
Attorneys for Petitioner Utah 
Associated Municipal Power 
Systems 
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